agencies, international law relies heavily on the action of national agencies. Many view national judges as the best candidates within the national systems to grapple with this important task, because of their independent status and their apolitical role. 4 A judiciary that is independent of the national Government, that employs international standards by resorting to technical, non-political, legal discourse, promises indeed to be a perfect forum to interpret, apply and develop international norms.
An analysis of the jurisprudence of national courts in international matters reveals, however, that there exist other factors, besides the shared legal language and formal independence of the courts, factors that prevent the promise from being fulfilled. Can one blame the judges for their attitude? Faced with judicial decisions that distorted legal doctrines so as not to rule against governmental interests, some scholars have maintained that the particular judges should be blamed, and that a better education in international law, or different nominating processes, could be the key to improvement 5 A comparative analysis, however, shows that the jurisprudence of the national courts is consistent in protecting short-term governmental interests. Judges firmly refuse to live up to the vision of international lawyers. They are careful not to impinge with their decisions on their governments' international policies and interests. This consistent attitude is not the product of lack of courage or knowledge, but rather is the result of deeper factors that are explored below.
It is possible to identify the judicial tendency to defer to the Government in three distinct stages of the application of norms. First, courts tend to interpret narrowly those articles of their national constitutions that import international law into the local legal systems, thereby reducing their own opportunities to interfere with governmental policies in the light of international law. Second, national courts tend to interpret international rules so as not to upset their governments' interests, sometimes actually seeking guidance from the executive for interpreting treaties. Third, courts use a variety of 'avoidance doctrines', either doctrines that were specifically devised for such matters, like the act of state doctrines, or general doctrines like standing and justiciability, in ways that give their own governments, as well as other governments, an effective shield against judicial review under international law. Many constitutions contain specific references to international law that determine the status of international law within the domestic legal system. 6 Usually these references incorporate one source of international law, either treaties or customs, and leave out the other sources. In view of these distinctions, arguments were made to the effect that the constitutional reference to one source, say customary law, should be interpreted as impliedly incorporating the other source, say treaties, as well. Despite scholarly endorsement of such arguments, they have never been adopted by national courts. 7 The constitutions of Austria (Article 9 of the 1920 Constitution), Germany (Article 25 of the 1949 Basic Law), and Italy (Article 10 of the 1947 Constitution), all declare that the generally recognized rules of international law shall form part of the domestic legal system. 8 In all three countries it was argued before the Constitutional Courts that since the principle of pacta sunt servanda was a generally recognized rule of international law, it also formed part of domestic law and thus additionally provided for the similar applicability of treaty-based law. Each of the Courts rejected this argument 9 The opposite case took place in the Netherlands. The Netherlands Constitution refers to treaties, and does not mention customary law. Article 93 of the 1983 Constitution provides that '[pjrovisions of treaties and of resolutions of international institutions, which may be binding on all persons by virtue of their contents shall become binding after they have been published.' 10 The Dutch Supreme Court refused to accept an argument of a fortiori, and rejected the claim that in view of the applicability of treaties, it must also accept the applicability of other sources of international law, including customary law.'' Another issue to be determined by courts was the weight that should be given to those international norms that constitute a part of the domestic legal system. In case of conflict between an applicable international obligation and an internal norm, which of the two is to prevail? Here too courts were generally hesitant, giving precedence to the local law. Thus, the French Constitutional Court declined to review the legality of legislation under the European Convention on Human supremacy of treaty obligations over local laws. 20 In its famous 1971 Lt Ski decision, the Belgian Court of Cassation, unable to rely on express provision in the Belgian Constitution, invoked the monist theory of the primacy of international law over national legislation, in determining that treaties supersede subsequent incompatible national laws. 21 These two interpretations are the exceptions that prove the rule.
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They show that those that rejected similar claims to enhance the status of international law within their systems, had a plausible alternative. In fact, this alternative interpretation was strongly advocated by eminent local scholars. 23 In other words, the interpretations that limited the role of international law bom with respect to its applicability and to its status vis-d-vis local law reflected a judicial choice, a hesitation from invoking international standards. This judicial timidity is further underlined by the entirely different attitude shown by some courts towards the executive's role in treaty-making and its effects on the domestic legal system. In this context the courts' interpretation increased the Government's power. In Israel the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence to conclude that the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, had implicitly approved the power of the executive branch to conclude and ratify treaties without legislative approval.
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The Supreme Court of the United States went even further when despite the constitutional requirement of the Senate's 'advice and consent' to treaties, it recognized the existence of other types of international agreements which are not subject to the Senate's approval and yet take effect in the legal system as part of the law of me land. 25 The Court's distinction between "treaties', which are subject to the procedure of 'advice and consent', and 'Executive Agreements', which are not, has no support either in the US Constitution or in international law. Moreover, the Court offered no guidelines to distinguish between these instruments: it conferred upon the executive the unfettered discretion to make this distinction. 26 War II the majority of international agreements to which the United States is a party are referred to as Executive Agreements and thus do not pass the muster of the Senate.
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B. The Second Stage: The Determination and Interpretation of International Norms
How do courts determine whether a certain international custom has emerged? How do they interpret international customs and treaties that form part of die local legal system? What meaning do they give to decisions of international Institutions established under treaties? The examination of these questions reveals that here too one can clearly discern an apprehensive judicial attitude, deferring to the executive.
International Custom
The method of inquiry used by a national court in examining the existence of a custom is likely to reflect its national affiliation. Thus, one should expect the courts of developing countries to invoke multilateral instruments as well as U.N. instruments as evidence of customary law. 28 On die other hand, a court in a Western jurisdiction is most likely to insist on evidence of actual conduct by a considerable number of states for a substantial period of time as a prerequisite for the identification of a customary rule. These different methods of inquiry reflect different national interests, hi addition, different conclusions can sometimes be drawn even when using die same methods of inquiry. In any case, the outcome is likely to conform with national interests.
29 It is especially rare for a national court to invoke customary law against its own executive.
At 
Treaties
The interpretation of treaties by national courts will determine whether or not any given treaty is directly applicable, or 'self-executing', in the internal legal system without implementing legislation. Interpretation will also determine the relationship between the applicable treaty and related statutes. The reliance on the executive in interpreting the contents of a treaty is heavy. France is the country which is usually referred to as a peculiar example in this context Until recently the rule used to be that the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs was the only authority competent to interpret treaties to which France was a party. 37 The administrative courts went even further when they declined to review under treaty law the legality of administrative acts. European jurisdictions have foiled to follow the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in which the latter interpreted the 1950 Convention. 48 One can predict that it would be quite difficult to avoid the implementation of United Nations' Security Council decisions, which are binding upon member states according to Article 25 of the Charter, since such decisions would most probably contain directly applicable instructions. Yet even such decisions could sometimes be avoided through interpretation or by invoking domestic principles.
C The Third Stage: The Use of Avoidance Doctrines
Certain judge-made doctrines relieve the national courts of the duty to enforce norms of international law in some politically sensitive situations. In most cases these doctrines remove from judicial review issues that might adversely affect the executive's interests in the realm of international politics.
The British Act of State doctrine provides that F.ngiish courts shall not entertain a claim of an alien regarding the activities on foreign soil done on behalf of the Crown or ratified by it. 50 Although this doctrine is unique to the British system, a similar outcome is reached in other jurisdictions by using different barriers to claims against the national executive. In the United States there are several of these obstacles, ranging from standing and non-justiciability through sovereign immunity to lack of cause of action against governmental violations of international law. Thus, some courts have held that individuals had no standing to challenge alleged violations of international law, unless the involved foreign sovereign did not register a formal complaint regarding the violation. 51 This rule, for example, was invoked by the District Court for the Southern District of Florida to reject the claim of General Noriega, the abducted Panamanian strongman, that the illegality of die invasion of Panama deprived the court of jurisdiction over him. 52 '' and unilaterally terminate agreements.
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The timidity of national courts is not reserved to claims under international law against the national governments. It encompasses also claims against foreign governments or against their interests. The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity is well entrenched in the various domestic systems. 59 Initially explained as derived from the notion of comity and equality between sovereigns, 60 today sovereign immunity is justified on the basis of judicial prudence in light of possible adverse political ramifications to the forum state from a judgment on the merits. 61 Of course, the granting of immunity to a foreign Government is in the interests of the local Government as well, as the latter may hope to rely on reciprocal treatment in the foreign jurisdiction. Finally, the national courts' reliance on the executive occurs also with respect to the question of recognition of foreign states and governments. In common law countries the rule is that courts do not form their own views on these matters. Instead they must refer to the ministry of foreign affairs. A certificate issued by the latter shall be conclusive evidence to the truth of its contents. This procedure ensures that die state will not speak in two voices on the matter, and that only die executive's voice will be heard. 71 When die issue concerns recognition of governments, and die practice of die ministry of foreign affairs does not include issuing formal recognition, die courts will have to reach an independent decision, yet a decision that will most likely be heavily influenced by die policy of their Government towards die foreign one. 72 executive in such matters. Nevertheless judges informally seek governmental guidance on these questions.
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D. Tracing the Policies That Motivate Judicial Timidity
The doctrines discussed above are all judge-made. Also common to all of them is the fact that opposite avenues were legally possible, and in some cases those opposite paths were ardently urged by scholars. The choice for judicial timidity is thus apparent both from the consistent attitude of each national court in using the various legal shields it has armed itself with, and from the comparative study that produces a quite invariable picture in most jurisdictions. What are the reasons for this judicial deference to the political branches of Government? Why do judges quite eagerly relieve the executive from checks and balances in matters of international relations? Sometimes courts hint at their motives. When they do so they refer to the mysterious realm of international politics in which their intrusion, they fear, will only hurt national interests by binding the executive to rules which do not constrain other actors. The following statement of the British House of Lords, in a matter concerning a Spanish law that compulsively acquired shares of certain companies, captures this thought: Note that by refusing to review their Government's conduct in international affairs, the courts deprive the Government of the aura of legitimacy it enjoys in the internal sphere. 77 The lack of review prevents the courts from the opportunity, to uphold the legality of the Government's conduct abroad. But neither the Government nor the public at large seem to be troubled by this outcome. Democratic societies which ardently protect the rule of law within their communities seem ready and even willing to grant their executive branch carte blanche to mold their country's external relations unfettered by international law. Therefore they are ready to accept these judge-made doctrines mat substantially hinder access to courts.
The concern for a free governmental hand in external affairs is sometimes entwined with a concern for the internal democratic process, a concern that is often mentioned when international law is pleaded in circumstances that cannot impinge directly on the country's external relations. 78 Judges and commentators invoke the separation of powers doctrine to block international norms that did not receive the express approval of the country's legislature, explicitly preferring the opinion of the local voters over international standards. 79 This concern is unpersuasive in many respects, 80 and its reiteration must be attributed to the fact that judges find it impossible to distinguish between the different contexts in which international law is invoked. 81 The concern is that by giving effect to international norms in a case that does not impact on national interests a precedent would be created that would necessitate a similar deference to international norms when national interests may be harmed. In short, the separation of powers rationale is more an excuse than a reason for the judicial disinclination to implement international norms.
Aside from the political advantages that such judicial deference bestows upon the executive, there are sometimes also important economic ramifications to the courts' unwillingness to implement international norms to question the legality of foreign measures. If, for example, a court were to question the legality under international law of a foreign nationalization of an oil concession, it would most probably bring about the suspension of supply of the oil extracted in breach of the concession to the forum state. The nationalizing state would then seek, and presumably find, other markets for its export Since under present conditions it is highly unlikely that courts in all jurisdictions would join in a conceited reaction to such unlawful nationalizations, no court would want to act unilaterally, thereby adversely affecting its national economy for the sake of international order. Sometimes we do find the courts invoking international law (or the doctrine of ordre public) to annul the effects of a foreign nationalization measure. This conduct, however, would usually be motivated by local feelings of animosity towards the foreign regime.
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National courts are the prisoners in die classic prisoner's dilemma. If they could have been assured that courts in other jurisdictions would similarly enforce international law, they would have been more willing to cooperate. They might have been ready to restrict their Government's free hand, had they been reassured that other governments would be likewise restrained. But in the current status of international politics, such cooperation is difficult to achieve, and rational judges act like the prisoner who cannot be sure that his or her fellow prisoner will cooperate.
What is therefore a precondition to increasing judicial application of international law is a community-wide commitment to cooperation. The model of the European Communities is the best evidence for the effect that changing commitments can have on judges' willingness to cooperate. The willingness of the national courts in Western Europe to apply unreservedly the Community norms has increased significantly in recent years, coinciding with the growing community-wide recognition of die need to align the economies of the Member States, and the increasing confidence in the Community's institutions. 83 Judges cannot alone bring about this new understanding, but once such a new understanding takes place, the courts will surely follow suit and then their decisions will enhance die inclination to cooperate. The jurisprudence of die Israeli Supreme Court with respect to die application of international norms reflects a conflict between opposing aims which die Court has striven to balance. 84 Being a small country, surrounded by enemies and relying on foreign assistance and encouragement, one could have expected die Israeli legislature, or its courts, to embrace international law as part of the legal system. And indeed, despite die fact that no law provides for die incorporation of international law into die local system, one of die earlier decisions of the Supreme Court on this subject did adopt a monist approach which could have meant die incorporation of all international norms without qualification. In explaining die Court's power to apply international law, Justice Cheshin relied on the very independence of die State of Israel:
The This reasoning is not unique. A similar approach was taken in early decisions of die United States Supreme Court, 86 and die Belgian and Luxembourg Courts of Cassation.
87 From a formal point of view, sovereignty per se does not necessarily involve die automatic incorporation of international law into national legal systems. 88 Therefore, die decision reflects a clear judicial choice for die applicability of international law. While diis decision discussed die applicability of a certain customary norm, namely die jurisdiction of die state over offences committed on ships sailing on die High Seas carrying the state's flag, die rationale expressed in this decision would further imply that treaty-based norms would also be part of die local legal system. While diis decision reflected die Court's choice to ensure compliance with international law, security considerations soon came to die fore and changed die Court's attitude. Events in die volatile Middle East made die Court keenly aware of Israel's security concerns. Cases involving international law would often come up before die Court entwined with considerations of national security. These considerations were reflected in administrative law, where considerations of military necessity, once invoked by die authorities, were rarely disputed by die Court. 89 It is my thesis is that these considerations have also influenced the Court into restricting the applicability of international norms. Just months after the abovementioned Stampfer decision, the Court clarified its position on die applicability of international law in the Samra case, which concerned die invokability of the 1949 Israeli-Jordanian General Armistice Agreement. 90 The respondents were Arabs whose village came under Israeli jurisdiction under the terms of die Agreement They claimed that in light of the Agreement, their lnnHq, which were situated near die IsraeliJordanian border, could not be deemed 'Absentees' Lands' nnHw Israeli law, and that therefore the claimants were entitled to regain control over those lands. In rejecting mis claim the Court adopted die common law rule that treated only customary lawand not international treaties -as binding law. The Armistice Agreement, being a treaty, could not be invoked in Israeli courts. 91 This fundamental distinction between customs and treaties is still die law today.
The rationale of this distinction relies on die separation of powers doctrine. Since in Israel the Government is empowered to conclude and ratify treaties, die claim goes, die automatic incorporation of treaties would grant the Government die power to introduce norms into die Israeli system thereby bypassing the legislature. 92 In criticizing die validity of this argument, it has been noted diat die same line of mought should have required me court to disregard customary law, which is also die outcome of governmental action or inaction.
93 But diis argument is flawed for odier reasons as wclL As mentioned, die separation of powers rationale is meaningful only when die Government may ratify treaties. But this power was not a given: it was die Supreme Court who approved 'a constitutional practice' that it found had developed, in which the legislature acquiesced in die delegation of die power to ratify treaties to die arguments, one must examine the questionable outcome of the adherence to the doctrine of separation of powers in this context The reliance on this doctrine does not protect the Israeli democracy from abuse of governmental powers, but quite the opposite: it effectively insulates the Government from judicial enforcement of its international undertakings.
In the specific case of the applicability of the laws of war in general and the laws regarding belligerent occupation in particular, the doctrine of separation of powers is actually irrelevant: these norms do not impinge on the rights and duties of persons within the state who are entitled to participate in the democratic process, but rather on the rights and duties of aliens residing on foreign, occupied soil. This is the reason why in Britain the courts have recognized that with respect to the international laws of war it is senseless to invoke the separation of powers doctrine. In a heterogeneous worid with a variety of convictions, it is quite difficult to identify rules so widespread that they would qualify as customs under Justice Shamgar's definition. Thus the recognition of only customary law as incorporated into the legal system, coupled with its restrictive definition, clearly narrowed the opening through which international norms could enter the Israeli legal system. In its effort to bridge the conflict between the interest of compliance with international standards and the requirement of national security on the level of legal principles, the Supreme Court has significantly limited the invokability of international norms in Israeli_courts not only to issues related to the laws of war, but also to human rights issues, and even to economic and trade relations.
B. Interpretation of the Applicable International Norms
As was noted in the first part of this article, the second strategy used by national courts in containing the impact of international norms is through their interpretation. The Supreme Court of Israel has not differed from its counterparts in other jurisdictions. Although the Court interpreted those norms that qualified as customary law independently, it never gave the norms meaning which conflicted with governmental policies. Thus, Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 102 which delimits the competence of an occupation administration to modify the legal status quo ante, has been interpreted rather broadly. The Court acknowledged that the occupant could modify a wide array of policies so as to accommodate what it considered to be the existing or even future needs of the occupied population. 103 Similarly, the Court has never declared that the methods used by the administration for the acquisition of immovable property in the territories were in principle incompatible with Articles 52 or 55 of the Hague Regulations. international norms was consolidated. Two trends are noticeable: on the one hand, the judicially imposed restrictions on the invokability and impact of international norms, and on the other the refusal to adopt doctrines that would allow the selective application of judicial review. These treads are the outcome of a three-fold effort to strive to maintain international standards, to bestow upon the executive an aura of legitimacy under international law, but without imposing restrictions on the executive which might compromise what the latter conceives to be in the national interest The appraisal of this jurisprudence should be conducted on two distinct levels. One is the internal Israeli level, concerning the policy grounds and the outcomes of the Court's rather restrictive approach towards international law. The other level deals with the specific outcomes of mat attitude with respect to the administration of the occupied territories. From the point of view of the Israeli legal system and Israeli interests, there is no doubt that the court's jurisprudence has taken its toll. Influenced by considerations of security or international relations, this apprehensive nttitude is also extended to matters of international trade and economic cooperation, and to other issues that have no connection whatsoever with the country's national security. In these latter cases there is little sense in limiting the applicability of treaty-based norms. As a matter of policy it is wrong not to allow litigants to invoke, for example, free-trade agreements or other commercial treaties in Israeli courts. It is similarly questionable why multilateral treaties concerning human rights, which the Government ratified (and thereby undertook to respect) and which do not impinge on the country's security interests may not be invoked in petitions against the Government Had the Court adopted certain 'avoidance doctrines', it might have been possible to differentiate between treaties dealing with occupied territories and commercial treaties, for example, and to apply only the latter ones. But die current jurisprudence prevents such a varied approach towards international norms.
With the Court's disregard of treaty-based laws, its strict definition of customary law, and its broad interpretation of the occupant's powers under those customary rules which were found to exist, the ultimate outcome of die jurisprudence of the Court was a refusal to deal with the territories as a truly international matter. Surely, die Court never treated these areas as part of Israel. Yet by practically stultifying the effectiveness of international law, on the one hand, and on thet)ther by its readiness to review die occupant's measures under the principles of Israeli administrative law, In addition, treaty-based law 'would subordinate Israeli law to provisions which had not been adapted to the conditions of this country, its interests and its residents.' 120 While these arguments could be relevant to the general question of the applicability of international norms within Israel, they clearly cannot justify the disregard of treaties dial impose restrictions on the occupying power with respect to aliens residing outside Israel. This statement, which overlooks the unique situation of occupation, highlights the fact that in fashioning a common attitude both with respect to the applicable international norms in the occupied territories and the general applicability of international law within the Israeli system, the Court has significantly limited the invokability of international law with respect both to Israel and the territories.
IV. Conclusion
National courts tend to limit the application of international law within the national legal systems, and to seek the guidance of their governments whenever national interests are involved. For this purpose an impressive array of legal principles have been judicially defined The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Israel coincides with that general tendency to limit the applicability of international law. Its concern with national security, and since 1967 its exercise of judicial review over the occupation administration, have significantly limited the applicability of international law both in Israel and in the territories. Since greater reliance on international law in national courts is dependent on a more positive attitude towards international cooperation, there is room for hope that the end of the anomalous situation of occupation and the lessening of security concerns would ultimately be reflected in a more positive attitude towards international law. 
